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BOOK REVIEW
THE WORD ON TRIAL
THE WORD AND THE LAw, by Milner S. Ball,* Uruversity of
CIncago Press, 1993. Pp. 216. $29.50
ROBIN WEST**
I. INTRODUCTION

Milner Ball's extraordinary book, The Word and the Law/
begInS with a narratIve account of "seven practIces In law ,,2 The
seven practitIoners Ball bnngs to life for the reader share two
powerful traits: they all, In quite different ways, use law to lessen the multIple suffenngs ofvanous communitIes of poor people,
and they all, by dOIng so, strengthen the communitIes witInn
wInch and for wInch they labor. One IS a landlord-tenant city
Judge, who both cares about the needs and protects the nghts of
poor tenants. 3 Another IS a tribal Judge, who Immerses Inmself
In the lives of the resIdents of the reservatIon over wInch he
presIdes In order to dispense an orgaruc and communal, as well
as orderly and moral, JustIce. 4 A tlnrd IS a law student, who
prepares herself to advocate for the homeless by shanng theIr
lodgIng In the New Haven Amtrak Rail StatIon. 5 A fourth, her
colleague and teacher, IS a dedicated Yale clirucIan who tIrelessly devotes Inmself to the needs of sometImes desperate clients
and the less desperate but nonetheless preSSIng concerns and
Interests of law students. 6 Another IS an ACLU lawyer and ac-
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1. MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAw (1993).

2. See m. at 7-72.
3. Id. at 24-38.
4. Id. at 38-49.
5. Id. at 60-72.
6. Id.

1101

HeinOnline -- 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1101 1993-1994

1102

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1101

tIVISt, a larger-than-life veteran of the Freedom Rides and antIwar movements, who, dnven by a life long paSSIon for JustIce,
agItates agamst thIs socIety's tolerance, even embrace, of the
death penalty 7 Another IS a legal serVIces lawy;er m eastern
Kentucky, deeply mvolved m the lives, illnesses and struggles of
the coal mmers for whom he labors,s and the last IS the head of
the Indian Law Resource Center, committed to retaImng or
reclaImmg the land-not Just nghtful compensatIOn-on whIch
displaced tribes can reestablish theIr socIety 9 Ball's descnptIons
of these legal practIces are effectIve, and affectIng. These people-two Judges, a student, a teacher, an advocate for the nghts
of NatIve Amencans, an actIVIst on behalf of a cause, and a
poverty lawyer-do come to life, and VIVIdly so. These stones
work. The reader gets a good sense of the humor, the sadness,
the motIvatIOns, the daily toils, and the emotIonal color of the
lives of these seven practitIoners.
The stones work m another sense as well. The reader gaIns
from these accounts not only a sympathetIc understanding of the
lives of seven lawyers, but a renewed sense of the possibilitles
theIr practIces present. ThIs can be put any number of ways.
Perhaps most sImply, Ball's retelling of these practIces opens the
possibility of finding m "legal practIce" a vehIcle for helpmg
people, for attending with care to the needs of people, for makmg a change m the world for the better, for actmg with compasSIon toward the end of socIal JustIce. These practIces deserve our
admIratIOn, but they are by no means beyond our grasp. They
are human-sIzed practIces that suggest the feasibility, and not
Just the nobility, of a profeSSIOnal life committed to socIal JustIce.
Put differently, these practIces open the possibility for finding
spIritual satIsfactIOn m legal work: for "sleepmg well at mght"
as one Judge puts It,10 for resolVIng what the Tikkun recently
has called "the cnSIS of meanmg" m our contemporary lives, 11
for discovenng the JOY that comes from losmg oneself m the
7. Id. at 7-16.
8. Id. at 16-24.
9. Id. at 49-60.
10. Id. at 37.
11. Michael Lerner, Memo to Clinton: Our First Hundred Days, TIKKUN, Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 8, 8.
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seI'Vlce of somethIng greater. These lawyers serve the poor and
will not, do not, and have not made money from theIr practIce of
law, but they are demonstrably happIer with themselves, theIr
pasts, and theIr world, than theIr more finanCIally successful
brethren. Not many students come to law school with the professed desIre to achIeve spIritual satIsfactIon. But these stones,
and the practIces they describe, are Important eVIdence that
those who do enter law with that ambitIon can surely succeed In
fulfilling it.
Another way to describe the "possibility" opened by these
practIces, and one that may be closer to the core of Ball's concerns, IS that these practIces open the possibility of "enlivemng"
the dead letter of law· of puttIng the Ghost back In the machIne,
of InvestIng law with the possibility of transcendence, of finding
In the nailed-shut crossed-t's and dotted-i's finality of the legal
text the possibility of multIple meamng, nuance, and subtlety,
and hence the unspoken prOmIse of a better, other world. To use
Ball's language, we mIght find In these legal practwes what we
rarely find In the legal statute, commercIal contract or JudiCIal
opImon: some eVIdence of our trust In the "presence of God," or
some eVIdence of h~s trust In our creatIvity, rather than eVIdence
of our wager on hIs absence, as we expect to find In the legal
documents we read and often Intend to plant In the legal documents we draft.12 These practIces open the possibility, In other
words, of a spIritual awakemng of law itself. They remInd us, to
quote one of the subJects, of that "shImng moment" when the
"system" was actually attentIve to the VOIces and needs of the
poor. 13 They underscore the SImple truth that it IS an ever-present possibility that it mIght become so agaIn.
Put yet another way, these practIces open the possibility of
USIng the law, whIch so often oppresses, as a vehIcle for liberatIOn: of finding, agamst all odds, In the ambIguitIes of the ConstitutIon the message of deliverance for NatIve Amencan tribes,
rather than the expreSSIon of mendacity and a policy of reckless

12. Tins IS the concern of Chapter Six, entitled Morbldity and Viability m Law.
See espeCIally BALL, supra note 1, at 136-42.
13. Id. at 38 (refernng to the Warren Court).
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annihilatIOn;14 of finding m the fine pnnt of the Housmg Code
the message of protectIOn agrunst the elements rather than the
free alienability of land and shelter;15 of finding m the complexitIes of the Federal Coal Mine, Health and Safety Act the promIse of compensatIOn for mJury rather than the bleak prospect of
"uphill lawyenng" withm the shadow of a four-out-of-a-hundred
success rate;16 of finding m the eloquent language of the Cruel
and Unusual Purushment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of
the ConstitutIOn a means of redeemmg the world through JUStIce, and nothmg more and nothlng less-certrunly not a "sacred
text" possessmg its own mtnnsIC value but also not an empty
promIse legItImatmg an unJust status quo;17 of finding m the
SImple communal folkways of a people a roadmap for a Just rule
of law rather than the end product of centunes of confinement
and oppressIOn;18 or of finding m the eyes of the Amtrak secunty guards the possibility for human empathy and warmth rather
than the thlrst for order and the threat of eVICtIOn. 19 All of
these lawyers see m law, legal mstitutIOns, documents, and
laws' enforcers the possibility that they mIght be used toward
the end of liberatmg the human spInt and nurtunng and sustammg the body Through theIr practIce, they make those POSSIbilitIes ever the slightly more real.
Finally, these practIces open the possibility of redeemmg, m a
sense, CIvilizatIon Itself. In vanous ways they realize the POSSIbility of usmg words, rules, laws, and clear linguIstIC structures,
coupled WIth force and the organIzed power of the state, m order
to create, strengthen, sustam, or unify, rather than destroy,
flatten, alienate, or oppress, a beloved people, or a blessed community The practIces Ball describes open the possibility of employmg law toward the end of life rather than death, and, more
speCIfically, of puttmg law to the servlce of the supplicatIOns of
the weak rather than the exploitatIve tendencIes of the

14. [d. at 49-60 (the story of Tim Coulter, actiVIst Native AmerIcan lawyer).
15. [d. at 24-38 (the story of Margaret Taylor, committed housmg court Judge).
16. [d. at 16-24 (the story of John Rosenberg, who represents coal mmers).
17. [d. at 7-16 (the story of Civil Rights crusader Henry Schwarzschild).
18. [d. at 38-49 (the story of tribal Judge DaVId Harding).
19. [d. at 60-72 (the story of Steve Wizner and Carla Ingersoll, tireless advocates
for the homeless).
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strong. 20 They open the possibility of employmg law toward the
end of truth rather than power. They open the possibility of
moral politIcs.
These stones ''work'' In a tInrd sense as well. The practIces
Ball describes do more than remInd us of the possibilitIes suggested above; they do more than InSpIre some of us to emulate
these practIces. They also serve, and I tInnk are Intended to
serve, as an effectIve reJoInder to a very specific and heretofore
unanswered critIque of law and "good lawyenng" that has
emerged from the law and literature movement, to wit, Richard
WeIsberg's Indictment of "the Word"-legalism and ChrIstendom
both-m Ins remarkable book The Failure of the Word. 21
WeIsberg's critIque IS quite different from the more familiar
critIques of legalism that have been urged by the CritIcal Legal
Studies movement and related critIcal movements In legal academIa. 22 Because WeIsberg's critIque IS itself an Important one,
and because Ball's stones at least to some degree are responSIve
to it (and apparently Intended to be so), both the critIque and
the way In wInch Ball's seven legal practIces mIght be construed
as its rebuttal are worth spelling out In some detail.
In Failure of the Word, through a close reading of a handful of
literary texts Involvmg lawyer-protagorusts, and most notably
through an unconventIonal but largely convmcmg InterpretatIOn
of the motIves of CaptaIn Vere In Herman Melville's claSSIC
novella Billy Budd, Sailor/3 WeIsberg argued that the apparently "good" ChrIstIan lawyer, through the marupulatIOn of
words, "the Word," laws, and the Rule of Law IS often, perhaps
usually, servICmg Ins own pnvate, "subJectIve," and perverse
ends, themselves fueled by an attitude of resentment, and a
tInrst for personal revenge.24 WeIsberg's work suggests that the
lawyerly or JudiCIal quest for JustIce through the "verbalizmg"

20. Id. at 135, 146-64.
21. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS
LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984).
22. See, e.g., DaVId Karrys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW 1 (DavId Karrys
ed., 1990) (exammmg the Critical Legal Studies movement).
23. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Hamson Hayford & Merton M.
Sealts, Jr. eds., 1962).
24. WEISBERG, supra note 21, at 131-76.
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forms of law, masks, at least on occaSIOn and perhaps typIcally,
an Ignoble and perverse quest by the "artIculate classes" for
revenge agamst the hated and feared purity of feeling and supenor physIcal and moral strength of the natural and nonverbal
human ammaP5 The lawyer, WeIsberg argued, even (perhaps
especIally) the "good lawyer," may be motIvated not by a desIre
to effectuate a Just order m an unjust world, but rather, by a
repugnance or revulsIOn, fueled by Jealousy, fear and resentment, agamst the natural, and partIcularly the pre-verbal, man
of mstmct, emotIOn, and physIcal strength. 26 The "good" done
by the good lawyer with both law and ChrIstIanity IS hopelessly
entangled with trus twIsted urge to use those forms to best the
man of natural strength with the artIfiCIal forms of CIvilizatIon-ChrIstIan love and legalistIc form.
The moral peril that WeIsberg's critIque umquely rughlights IS
not the familiar danger to wruch the CritIcal Legal Studies
movement attends 27 • that law ~tself, although apparently Just,
masks or legitImates mJustIce. Rather, WeIsberg focuses on the
more subtle danger that regardless of the mJustIce or JustIce of
the substantIve legal regIme, the personality of the mdiVIduals
who must be relied upon to realize a legal order IS an untrustworthy one. The most Ideal legal regIme can be put to the furtherance of the perverted ends of the resentful and vengeful
lawyer or Judge. 28 The use of ChrIstIamty to effectuate a VICtOry
over the pagan religIons, like the use and mlsuse of legalism to
effectuate VIctones over the Nietzchean natural man, should be
understood as a part of trus rustoncal struggle. Although perhaps not meVItable, the possibility of perversIOn fueled by
ressentIment IS ever-present.
Ball tells us m rus acknowledgements that at least rus title IS
mspIred m part by WeIsberg's thesIs. 29 If Ball mtended rus own
book to serve as a reJomder to WeIsberg's critIque, the stones
are well chosen. The practIces portrayed m The Word and the

25. See ld., see also ld. at 1-9.
26. Id. at 131-76.
27. See, e.g., KalryS, supra note 22, at 1-9.
28. ConSIder, In thIS regard, Jean Baptiste Clamence, the protagorust
CAMUS, THE FALL (1956).
29. BALL, supra note 1, at 166.
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Law mdeed are effectIve responses to WeIsberg's Nietzchean
polaritIes. These lawyers are not perverse. They seek neither
personal wealth nor power. They do not suffer from dark, hIdden, comprOmIsmg motIves; theIr actIons do not constitute the
outward manifestatIon of a secret contempt for men of actIon, of
blood, of the flesh. They are not twIsted mtellects, seekIng revenge agaInst the directness of nature. They are not real-life
CaptaIn Veres, usmg the forms of law and the rituals of
ChrIstIanity to diSguIse SICk subjectIve ends. These lawyers' ends
are sImple, and even natural. They are "of the flesh."
But nor are Ball's lawyers creatures of ammalistIc will. TheIr
actIons are not the honest, pre- or non-verbal, direct acts of the
SImple-mInded, childlike, mnocent, natural man. Just as the
reader will find no CaptaIn Veres m these stones, she will not
find any Billy Budds. As Ball repeatedly emphasIzes, these lawyers are professIOnals who are good at what they do and enJoy
domg it,a° and what they do IS use the forces of law, the sanctIOn of the State, and the rules of CIvility and CIvilizatIon, m
order to achIeve ends dictated by compaSSIOn, kIndness and
fellow feeling. To use WeIsberg's language, theIr practIces are
verbal and powerful. 31 Indeed, they are usmg the linguIstIc
structures of law to coerce results that could not be achIeved
through the powers bestowed upon them by nature. But theIr
motIvatIon does not denve from a resentment, fear, or Jealousy
of the natural realm. TheIr practIces are not responses to a
twIsted and narCIssIstIc need to quell natural forces toward one's
own subjectIve end, but rather, borrOWIng Ball's language, they
are responses to the Word; they exemplify the success, so to
speak, rather than the failure, of the Word. In a secular context,
the practIces are aImed at creatIng community by alleVIatIng the
suffenng of others and not at Imposmg a perverse subjectIve
agenda on an unsuspectIng world through the apparently mnocent forms of law and ChrIstIan feeling. TheIr motIves are
nonduplicitous, theIr goals are SImple, and theIr methods are the
methods of law-rules, distInctIons, arguments, wordiness, CIvili-

30. Id. at 156-58.
31. WEISBERG, supra note 21, at 1-7, 177-79.
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ty 32 In other words, these lawyers represent the possibility
that WeIsberg's study demes eXIsts.
Had Ball ended hIs book with hIs accounts of these lawyers'
practIces, he would have produced a remarkable and Important
book. The descnptIOns of theIr practIces alone, with almost no
needed commentary, bnng to life moral ways of liVIng m law
that are worthy of emulatIOn, admIratIon, and consIderatIOn.
Ball's accountmg of them bnngs to life a subJectIVIty that seemmgly IS the antithesIs of the "ressentIment" WeIsberg finds so
prevalent m Western and ChnstIan legal thought and practIce.
But of course, Ball's book does not end sImply with these
descnptIOns. The second half of the book contams what nught be
charactenzed best as a sequence of meditatIons on some of the
possibilitIes opened up by the lawyers' stones. Most Importantly,
Ball explores the possibility that the distmguIshIng feature of
these practIces IS that they are liVIng responses to God's Word.
As such, Ball ultImately concludes that, unsurpnsmgly, they
share the traits noted above: that all of these practitIOners serVIce the poor and build community 33 Ball wants ultImately to
leave us WIth the possibility that theology can be brought to
bear on the attempt to understand these practIces, and that by
domg so, we can discern a relatIOn between God's Word and the
legal work of these seven mdiVIduals. The workIngs of God's
Word can be found m these practIces.
These meditatIOns reSIst sImple summary or recapItulatIon.
No clear line of argument ultImately builds toward the concluSIOn noted above; the book IS avowedly "expenmental" and nonlinear. 34 Ball employs not only theologIcal argument, but also
literary mterpretatIOn, JournalistIc reportIng, a good deal of
personal narratIve, and sImply, moral reflectIOn to engage the
reader directly WIth both the seven practIces and with the texts,
biblical, literary, and legal, that he bnngs to the task of understanding. These meditatIOns are overflOWIng with mSIght, suggestIOn, descnptIOn, self-revelatIOn, mterpretatIOn, and stones
withIn stones wIthm stones. While never sentImental, hIs medi-

32. Id. at 158-64.
33. Id. at 150-55.
34. Id. at 1, 73.
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tatIOns are truly hearterung. They tell the story of one man's
Intellectual attempt to make moral and religIous sense of hIs
own life, and the lives of some people he admIres, In law It IS a
story, and an Intellectual Journey, that IS well conceIved and
well told.
In the remaInder of thIs ReVIew, I will comment very bnefly
on two of the theologIcal themes that recur In Ball's meditatIons
and note what I thInk are some possible connectIOns between hIs
theologIcal arguments and some of our legal practIces and habits
of mInd. Thus, In Part II below, I will explore the possibility
that the discussIOn Ball proVIdes of the use of parables In the
Bible, and partIcularly hIs challengIng InterpretatIOn of a passage from the Book of Mark regarding the use of parables, mIght
also shed some light on the use of narratIve by critIcal race theonsts, as well as some of the recent critIcIsm that narratIve Junsprudence has elicited. In Part III, I bnefly suggest that the relatIon for whIch Ball argues between relii:;1.on and Belief, or between religIOUS practIces and God's Word, may find an echo In
the relatIon between law and JustIce. I hope that by draWIng
analOgIes between the theologIcal arguments Ball makes about
religIon and the Word, on the one hand, and some of our contemporary debates about law and JustIce, on the other, I am not
tnVIalizIllg or grossly mIsstatIng Ball's positIOns. I must emphaSIze that the analOgIes I draw are mIne, not hIs, and I apolOgIze
for any distortIon III hIs positIOns that may result from my attempt to make a coherent claIm that fruitful analOgIes eXIst.
II. NARRATIVlTY, PARABLE, AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING
The most techrucal, one of the lengthIest, perhaps the most
mystenous, and I thInk the pIvotal chapter of thIs book, entitled
Mark, Isawh, and the Empty Place, puts forward an InterpretatIon of Mark 4:10-12.35 In that passage, Mark tells us that Jesus, to the frustratIon and bewilderment of hIs Immediate listeners and future generatIons of biblical scholars, explaIned to
hIs diSCIples that the reason he couches hIs teachIngs In parables IS not to promote understanding, as one mIght thInk, but

35. Id. at 106-28.
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very much to the contrary The reason he uses parables IS to
prevent understanding:
And when he was alone, those who were about hun with
the twelve asked concermng the parables. And he srud to
them, ''To you has been gIven the secret of the kIngdom of
God, but for the others everythIng IS m parables; m order
that they may 'indeed see but not perceIve, and may mdeed
hear but not understand; lest they should turn agrun, and be
discharged. ,,36

ThIs IS, as Ball tells the reader several tImes, a very difficult
passage.37 Why would Jesus do such a sadistIc thIng? Why
would he say such a perverse thmg? What does it mean to teach
If the pomt of the teachmg IS to block understanding? Ball's
brave mterpretatIOn of thIs difficult passage alone IS worth the
pnce of the book. First, Ball argues, m a largely techmcal argument well beyond the scope of thIs diSCUSSIOn, that a close readmg of the relevant texts cannot sustaIn the much more bemgn
renditIOn of Jesus' words offered by Matthew m Matthew 13:1315.38 Matthew's Jesus reports that he speaks m parables because the people cannot explaIn hIs message, not m order to
msure that they fail to understand. 39 ThIs reading, Ball argues,
while certamly a more comfortmg one, does not withstand scrut my 40
Of more Immediate mterest to the general readershIp of thIs
book, however, Ball also argues agaInst a powerful reading of
thIs passage put forward by Frank Kermode m hIs Justly acclaImed book, The Genes~s of Secrecy 41 Kermode uses the passage from Mark to argue, m effect, for the necessary and Irreducible opaqueness of narratIve texts. 42 The passage, Kermode
argues, like Kafka's famous parable "Before the Law,,,43 IS eVIdence of the peculiar way m whIch narratIves, by VIrtue of theIr

106-07 (quoting Mark 4:10-12).
106, 111.
107-19.
107.
109.
41. FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY (1979).
42. Id. at 33-34.
43. FRANZ KAFKA, PARABLES AND PARADOXES 60-79 (1972).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
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openness, both mvite and defy mterpretatlOn. 44 Because narratIve texts are "open," they reqUIre mterpretatlOn, but because of
that same openness, they defy authoritatIve mterpretatlOn: they
cannot be reduced to, or translated mto, a senes of argumentatIve propositIons. Narratlvity "reqUIres and frustrates mterpretatlOn; It makes mterpretatlOn necessary and VIrtually
Impossib1e."45 Ball quotes Kermode's conclusIOn: '~Hot for secrets, our only conversatIOn may be with guardians who know
less and see less than we can; and our sole hope and pleasure IS
m the perceptIOn of a momentary radiance, before the door of
disappomtment IS finally shut on US.,,46
Ball puts forward a quite different account. Ball reads thIs
passage as Mark's direct testImony, m effect, to the power of
God's Word. 47 Mark's accountIng of Jesus' profoundly opaque
remarks about the opaqueness of parables, Ball argues, m effect
prefigures the account Mark gIves at the end of the Book of the
"empty tomb" found by Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of
James, and Salome, who were expectIng to find the body of
Chnst:
And when the sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and
Mary the mother of James, and Salome, brought spIces, so
that they nught go and anomt hIm. And very early on the
first day of the week they went to the tomb when the sun
had nsen. And they were saymg to one another, ''Who will
roll away the stone for us from the door of the tomb?" And
lookmg up, they saw that the stone was rolled back, for it
was very large. And entermg the tomb, they saw a young
man sittmg on the nght sIde, dressed m a white robe; and
they were amazed. And he srud to them, ''Do not be amazed;
you seek Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified. He has nsen,
he IS not here; see the place where they lrud hIm. But go, tell
hIs diSCIples and Peter that he IS gomg before you to Galilee;
there you will see hIm, as he told you." And they went out
and fled from the tomb; for trembling and astorushment had

44. KERMODE, supra note 41, at 33.
45. BALL, supra note I, at 107 (summanzmg Kermode's position).
46. Id. (quoting KERMODE, supra note 41, at 144-45).
47. BALL, supra note I, at 108, 128, 129-30.
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come upon them; and they saId nothIng to anyone, for they
were afraId.48

The connectIOn between these two passages, Ball argues, IS
that Mark's account of the "empty tomb" at the end of the Book,
like the empty tomb ~tsel{, and Mark's account of Jesus' explanatIon of the use of parables, like the parables themselves, all create an "empty space," or an "irruptIon" In settled understandings
and expectatIons, In whIch God's Word either will or will not be
revealed. 49 The parables, like the koan-like account Jesus proVIdes of theIr opaqueness, "create a space," Ball goes on to argue, Into whIch the reader cannot or should not thrust hImself,
whether through an act of InterpretatIOn, of despaIr, or of the
will. 50 The passage eVIdences not the necessIty and ImpOSSIbility of InterpretatIon of narratIve, as Kermode contends, but
the absolute asymmetrIcal PrIority of God to the believer, of the
diVIne to the natural, of the Word to the powers of understandIng. It IS not, so to speak, left to us to "find God" by workmg
through the parables, or even to "find ourselves" by clOSIng the
narratIve text with our "own" InterpretatIOn. Rather, the
opaqueness of Jesus' account of the parables, and the opaqueness of the parables themselves, and perhaps by extensIOn the
opaqueness of narratIVIty, proVIdes a different sort of InvitatIon
altogether: It InVItes humility by causmg an "irruptIon" In our
understandings, mcluding our understanding of our Intellectual
or InterpretIve powers. 51 WithIn the space created by that IrruptIOn, Ball suggests, the Word of God may, or may not, be
revealed. 52
At the sIzeable rIsk of sounding outrageous, I'd like to suggest
that Ball's understanding of thIs passage, as well as the understanding of the nature of narratIve that it suggests, mIght cast
needed light on the IncreaSIng, and IncreasIngly controversIal,
use of narratIVIty and parable by critIcal race theOrIsts, and to a
lesser extent by some femInIst legal theOrIsts. In the last couple

48. Id. at 125 (quoting Mark 16:1-8).
49. Id. at 125-27.

50. Id. at 125.
51. Id. at 124-35.
52. Id. at 127.
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of years, the use of narratIve by these "outsIder" JUTIsprudes has
come under a consIderable amount of critIcal attack. 53 In essence, the questIons posed by the critIcs of the "narratIve scholars" are the same questIOns posed to Jesus by hIs discIples: Why
use narratIves? Why speak In parables? Why not sImply make
the argument, explaIn the POInt? What, if anythIng, does narratIve add to a legal argument that could not be effected far
more cleanly and less ambIguously with straIghtforward analytIc
claIms?
There IS, of course, a conventIOnal explanatIon for the use of
narratIve In critIcal race and femImst JUTIsprudence. As I and
others have argued, the POInt of USIng narratIvity In thIs
scholarshIp may be to brIng to the fore arguments and understandings that for some reason can not be grasped or artIculated
In more conventIonal ways.54 For example, narratIvity may be
an Important method for femImsts because of the peculiar "pnvateness" of so many of the InJUTIes women sustaIn. The nature
of these InJunes must be commumcated before theIr InJustIce
can be made manifest, and narratIve IS VIrtually the only POSSIble way thIs commumcatIon mIght take place. Similarly,
narratIvity may be an Important method for critIcal race theonsts because of the "frequency," as well as the unfamiliarity,
and hence the life-aItenng consequences and profundity, of so
many of the InJUTIes Inflicted by pnvate raCIsm. NarratIvity may
be the only-hence the best-way to commumcate the felt reality of beIng an AfrIcan Amencan In thIs culture, subJect to the

53. See Suzanna Sherry & Damel A. Farber, Telling Stones Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratiues, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) (critiCIZIng some femlDlsts
and critical race theonsts for de-emphasIzIng methods of conventional analYSIS and
overemphasIZIng sometimes atypIcal or Inaccurate stones that have emotional appeal); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251
(1992) (CritiCIZIng race theonsts' use of narrative Junsprudence).
54. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositiomsts and Others: A Plea
for Narratiue, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2440 (1989) ("Stones are useful tools for the
underdog
All movements for change must gam the support, or at least the
understanding, of the dOmInant group."); Man Matsuda, Public Response to RaclSt
Speech: Consldermg the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989) (urgIng legal
sanctions for raCIst speech by fOCUSIng on stones of the effects of raCIst hate messages); RobIn West, EconomIc Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER
L. REV. 867 (1988) (concluding that literary legal analysIs helps people to understand and sympathIze with others).
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multIple mJunes of pnvate, mstitutIOnal, and unconSCIOUS racIsm. When employed for either reason, or for reasons closely
aligned, critIcal narratIvity IS then servmg utterly traditIonal
JUTIsprudentIal ends, albeit through an unconventIonal method,
and it should be Judged and cntICIzed by reference to how well
or poorly it serves those ends. 55
Whether or not thIs "conventIOnal" accountIng of the disproportIOnate use of narratIVIty m critIcal race and femIlllst legal
studies-to wit, that cntIcal scholars use narratIve when conventIonal forms of argument are for some reason madequate to
the entIrely conventIonal end of explammg the nature of an
mJury, and then advocatmg a partIcular legal reform for its redress-accurately captures the motIves of narratIve scholars, for
vanous reasons, it has not satIsfied the critIcs of narratIve JUTISprudence. According to theIr mamstream critIcs, the narratIve
scholars, or at least many of them, SImply have not met the
burden of shOWIng that the use of narratIve IS either necessary
or suffiCIent to meet the shared ends of legal discourse. 56 I do
not WIsh to comment here on the merits of that debate. What I'd
like to suggest more SImply IS that Ball's diSCUSSIOn of the text
from Mark Implies, albeIt mdirectly, that the premIse of thIs
debate mIght be mIsguIded: both the defenders and the critIcs
may be wrong to assume that thIs "conventIonal" account IS the
best or only account one mIght prOVIde for the use of narratIve
by outsIder legal scholars.
Of course, one mIght expect Jesus to have made preCIsely thIs
"conventIonal" account of narratIve when asked to explam hIs
reliance on parable. Sensibly we mIght have expected Jesus to
explam that parable IS used where conventIOnal explanatIon
fails. Partly because of the weIght of that expectatIOn, the account Jesus does gIve m the quoted passage from Mark-that
the use of parable does and IS mtended to obfuscate, and to
prevent rather than promote understanding-seems so alarmmg. 57 It IS a natural questIOn to ask, then, whether Jesus' radi55. Perhaps the most exhaustive attempt to explrun, Justify, and partly criticIze
narrative JurIsprudence along these lines IS Kathryn Abrruns, Heanng the Call of
StOrieS, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1992).
56. Id. at 977-78.
57. BALL, supra note 1, at 107-08 ("Jesus's saYIng lS deeply disturbmg").
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cally different explanatIOn for Ins use of parables, and the theolOgIcal as well as epIstemologIcal debate between Ball and
Kermode that that explanatIOn has trIggered, has anytInng to
say to our contemporary debate about the use of narratIve and
parable by critIcal race and femIrust legal scholars.
First, Kermode's account of that passage-that it IS testImony
to the opaqueness of narratIvity-does shed some light on the
controverSIes surrounding the use of narratIve by CritICal race
scholars, and it does so m a way that underscores the complamts of theIr maInstream critIcs. Kermode's mterpretatIOn of
Mark's account of Jesus' explanatIon of Ins use of parables, quite
directly explaIns, as well as Justifies, the discomfiture of maInstream scholars with the critIcal race scholars' use of narratIve.
If Kermode IS nght, then the traditIonal legal scholars are surely also nght to tInnk of narratIve as m some wayan illegitImate
form of discourse: narratIves SImply are opaque, Kermode argues; they truly cannot be translated mto a set of claIms. TheIr
use will only obfuscate Issues rather than further understandmg. For all of those reasons, they should not be a part of legal
argument, the goal of wInch must be, at least m part, to commurucate, and to commurucate clearly
The alternatIve explanatIOn for the use of narratIvity m CritIcal scholarsInp that Ball's mterpretatIOn of Mark's accountmg of
Jesus' comments suggests IS that, at least some of the tIme, the
use of narratIve by these scholars may promote and may be
mtended to promote a transformatIOn m the listener not by
broaderung understanding, but rather, m effect, by blockmg traditIonal understanding and forgIng m its place an "empty space."
LIsten agaIn to Ball: "Mark encourages the reader to approach
texts with expectant regard for what IS unSaId as well as what IS
SaId-for theIr open-endedness, silences, negatIve spaces, mexplicable disturbances, and OmISSIOnS as well as for theIr plaIn
statement. There the Word may be at work."s8 The same lesson,
I suggest, may be well applied to at least some of the narratIves
and parables put forward m scholarsInp by the outSIder legal
scholars. Two examples illustrate tIns pomt.

58. [d. at 129-30.
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In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, PatncIa Williams tells a
story about a black child mauled to death by two polar bears In
a ZOO.59 Unlike many of the other stones In tms book, wmch I
tmnk can be "translated" relatIvely easily Into straIghtforward
arguments about the nature of raCIsm and poverty,60 tms partIcular story, and her treatment of it, both reSIst and Invite
InterpretatIOn In preCIsely the way Kermode suggests. One surely can (and many no doubt do, Including me) Interpret the story
as beIng "about" the lethal effects of a pnmitIve, untmnkIng,
and even oddly "innocent" but brutal form of white raCIsm on
the AfrIcan Amencan community Other InterpretatIons, however, are "equally plausible," and it IS Indeed that "equal plausibilIty" that makes it Impossible to reduce the story about the polar
bears to any partIcular set of claIms about raCIsm-that IS the
sense In wmch narrativity renders InterpretatIon Impossible.
Williams' polar bears story, In other words, seems to be an example of the opaqueness wmch Kermode finds In narratIve generally Because it Invites multIple InterpretatIOn, it defies authoritatIve InterpretatIon. Its message IS always secret.
But perhaps there IS another way that at least thl.s partl.Cular
story operates on readers and listeners; another way it affects or
fails to affect people; another way it ''works.'' A student In my
law and literature class last semester told me In a fit of pIque
that "I don't have any Idea what the polar bears are supposed to
be. I hate thIS quaSI-poetIc stuff." Then she smiled and SaId, ''but
it did make me stop." Two weeks later tms student who had
claImed no Interest In race wrote and presented a fine paper
about unconscIOUS raCIsm In vanous pIeces of literature. I don't
tmnk it IS too much of a stretch to say that at least for tms
student, the polar bears story created an "empty space" or an
"irruptIOn" In her preconceIved Views of race and raCIal Injury In
the sense Ball attributes (if I've got tms nght) to Mark's understanding of Jesus.

59. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR 207-08 (1991).

60. I tned to do so m my reVIew of Williams' book. See Robm West, Murdenng
the Sp~rit: Rac~sm, Rights and Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771 (1992) (book reVIew).
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My second example concerns a pIece by Mane Ashe entitled
Zig-Zag St~tchmg,61 In whIch Ashe, among many other thIngs,
narrates the pamful and dangerous CIrcumstances of the bIrths
of her several children In graphIc detail. These stones, like the
polar bears story, defy Interpretation. In fact, the effect these
narratives had, at least on me, and I thInk on many other readers, wasn't even In the mental realm. The effect was phYSICal.
Ashe's descnptIOns of her expenences giVing bIrth made me sIck;
I went home that day and crawled In bed and stayed there.
Those stones made me stop. I was made aware quite literally of
an "empty space," a space the borders of whIch are defined by
the maternal expenence of bIrth and its attendant dangers, and
a space that IS uncovered by legal scholarshIp and largely uncovered by culture, and a space Into whIch I feared to tread.
Critics of narrative and femImst JUTIsprudence have criticIzed
Zig-Zag St~tchmg largely because it IS not clear how, if at all,
Ashe's narratives contribute to the larger argument she IS makIng In the pIece, or even what the larger argument mIght be. 62
In one sense, the critiCIsm IS well taken, and even understated.
Ashe's pIece ultimately argues for the deregulatIon of the proViSIOn of reproductive health care,63 and if anythIng, the stones
she tells seem to counsel toward the opposite conclusIOn. But In
another sense, the critiCIsm IS wildly mIsplaced. The maJor effect
of Ashe's narratives, I thInk, and perhaps IntentIOnally so, are
Ballian rather than Kermodian. They cause an IrruptIOn In the
complacent public and cultural wilful blindness to the meamng
of the expenence of giVing bIrth. ThIs pIece, entitled Zig-Zag
St~tchmg, tears at the seamless SOCIal cloth of silence that surrounds the expenence and the danger of giVing bIrth. Whether it
does so "successfully" or not has nothIng to do with how, and
whether, it supports or detracts from arguments for deregulating
health care. It has, rather, everythIng to do with what happens
next, with what it prompts, or with what IS revealed In the empty space it creates.

61.
tion"
62.
63.

Mane Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitchmg and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproducand the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989).
See Sherry & Farber, supra note 53, at 847.
Ashe, supra note 61, at 383.
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At any rate, Ball's mterpretatIOn of Mark's account of Jesus'
bewildenng comments about the opaqueness of narratIve IS
Itself, to say the least, somewhat opaque. Ball hImself characterIzes hIs mterpretatIon as tentatIve, as a work-m-progress. 64 I'm
not sure I understood what Ball was saYIng, and I'm sure I don't
see what Jesus was saYIng. But thIs much IS clear: it did make
me stop.

III.

THE PENULTIMATE

"No" AND

THE ULTIMATE ''YES''

The second maJor theme of Ball's meditatIOns IS presented m
a far more accessible-because less mystenous and less techmcal-chapter than that discussed above, entitled Dilsey, Baby
Suggs, and the Nonreligwus Word. 65 In that chapter, Ball mtroduces first a critIque of religIosity, and then a partIal endorsement: m hIs words, a penultImate "No" to religIOn, followed by
an ultImate ''Yes.''66 Both the critIque and the endorsement
play a maJor role m the book and are worth lookIng at m some
detail of theIr own nght. I, however, ultImately will argue that
whatever theIr theolOgIcal merits, Ball's arguments about religIon and God's Word are nchly suggestIve of a SImilar or analogous relatIOnshIp we mIght be able to artIculate between law
and JustIce.
The critIque begIns with a firm distmctIOn between belief and
religIOUS practIce, and between the Word of God and religIOUS
teachIngs:
The charactenstIc of religIOn that draws theolOgIcal critICIsm IS less its weakness than its strength: its attempt to
reach beyond the present world toward a god whom it postulates and whose help and protectIon its adherents Invoke.
ThIs attempt at self-transcendence IS worthy and noble. Its
worthIness and nobility are no small part of the difficulty
encountered In CritICIZIng it.
The questIon IS whether, by InvitIng self-transcendence,
religIOn IS not a mIsdirectIOn. In the biblical stones God gIves

64. BALL, supra note I, at 106.
65. [d. at 73-95.
66. [d. at 82, 102.
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hnnself and makes hnnself known. TIns self-revelatIOn does
not correspond to religIOn, to human stnvrng toward God.
The revealed Word does not fill m our vanous attempts to
make our way to God. In the receIved language for talkmg.
about these matters: Grace does not perfect nature, revelatIon does not complete reason, and mercy does not make up
the deficit of good works. God makes rus own way to humans,
and rus self-revelatIon bears its own possibilitIes for bemg
known or not known. Jacob's ladder extended from heaven to
earth, not the other way around.
If we try to grasp at God, we do not believe. If we did believe we would listen, but m religIOn, as Barth noted, we talk;
consequently, "because it IS a graspmg, religIOn IS the contradictIon of revelatIon [and IS] the concentrated expreSSIOn of
unbelief
RevelatIon does not link up with a human religIon wruch IS already present and practIced. It contradicts
it."67

Ball's critIque of religIOn IS not the familiar complaInt that
religIOn, much of the tIme, IS the handmaIden of exploitatIve
power. TIns POInt Ball fully concedes. TIns IS, Ball explaInS, religIon at its worst. 68 In other words, Ball's critIque of religIosity
IS not a critIque of orgaruzed religIon at its worst. It IS a critIque
of religIon, and of the religIOUS expenence, "at its best."69 The
problem with religIon "at its best," Ball argues, IS that it holds
out to the practitIoner the InvitatIOn to engage In forms of religIOUS devotIon wmch are at theIr root narclsslstIC. 70 The quest
for the expenence of personal transcendence, through the forms
of religIon, or for a ''hndge to heaven" through acceptance of
Jesus, to use the Sunday school formulatIOn of essentIally the
same theolOgIcal positIOn,71 paradOXIcally but Inevitably weds
the religIOUS devotee to a narCISSIstIc reflectIOn of self. Because
of that narCISSIsm, the dance of deliverance and transcendence
wmch religIon prOmIses IS, at root, a dance of death. It takes us

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
For a

79-80 (footnotes omitted).
76-77.
77.
81.
descnption of the "hndge to heaven," see zd. at 79-80.
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away from life, away from the world, away from our socIal ties
and away from our community, away from responsibility-In essence, away from the realm In whIch we may genUInely live a
life In response to God's Word.
Ball turns to Faulkner's Lzght m August72 for an account of
the harms done by "religion at its best"·
Some expenence of these ["noXIOUS possibilitIes of religIon at
its best"] IS available m
Lzght m August. In that novel, an
old, discredited, lost mInlster, the Reverend Gail Hightower,
hears the sounds of approachIng Sunday everung servIce m
the Presbytenan church that had been hIs parIsh years
ago
From hIs liVIng room WIndow, Hightower sees members of the congregatIon exchange greetIngs as they approach
from the streets. Then m hIs memory he hears theIr lowtoned talkIng as they enter the church for the Sunday everung prayer meetIng: "It has seemed to hIm always that at
that hour man approaches nearest of all to God, nearer than
at any other hour of all the seven days. Then alone, of all
church gathenngs, IS there somethIng of that peace whIch IS
the promIse and the end of the Church."
There, m "the
cool soft blOWIng of faith and hope," religIon achIeves its
apex
And yet.
''Yet even then the mUSIC has still a quality stern
and Implacable, deliberate and without paSSIOn so
much as ImmOlatIOn, pleading, askmg, for not love, not
life, forbIdding it to others, demanding m sonorous
tones death as though death were the boon, like all
Protestant mUSIC
Pleasure, ecstasy, they cannot
seem to bear: theIr escape from it IS m VIolence
And so why should not thezr religwn drwe them to
crucLfixwn of themselves and one another'l he thInks."
On the follOWIng day, the town lynches Joe Chnstmas.
At the very moment when theIr religIon carned those Presbytenans as close to God as it could, at that same pomt of
hIghest reach, it also drove its practitIoners away from God
toward death
ThIs IS religIon at its hIghest, not its lowest.

72. WILLIAM FAULKNER, LIGHT IN AUGUST (1932).
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It was when Martm Luther King saw southern churches'
that he was dnven to
"lofty sprres pomtmg heavenward"
ask, "What kmd of people worshIp here? Who IS theIr God?"
The answer to hIs question IS: ordinary white Amencan religIOUS people
at the moment of therr religIOUS best, religIous people may also be at therr most moribund. 73

The penultImate "No," though, IS followed by the ultImate
(although qualified) ''Yes.'' ReligIOn can be a lived, communal,
partIculanzed, response to the Word. It IS not mevitably the
Faulknenan dance of death described above. ReligIOn, and the
religIOUS expenence, can teach a despIsed people to love themselves. It can mfuse a feeling of purpose and solidarity and fellow feeling mto an otherwIse bleak eXIstence. It can redirect the
attentIon of the believer toward the community of life withIn
whIch one can live out a genUIne response to God's Word. When
religIon serves these ends, Ball argues, religIon m effect has
been "adopted" by the Word. 74 Like secular mst~tutwns, religIon
holds out possibilitIes; like secular mstitutIons, God mIght adopt
religIon toward His own ends. When He does so, religIon becomes "for life" rather than a dance of death; it counsels and
creates self love where such self love IS needed; it attends to the
mdiVIdual and the community where such attentIOn IS otherwIse
wantIng.
Ball agam turns to literature (and agam to Faulkner!) to
proVIde examples of religIon "adopted" by God's Word. The first
of two examples he gIves comes from Faulkner's The Sound and
the Fury 75 In the relevant passages from The Sound and the
Fury, the central character Dilsey, a servant, takes from an
Easter serVIce a feeling of renewal, after whIch everythIng IS the
"same yet different." She becomes, from her engagement with
thIs essentIally religIOUS expenence, powerful m her positIOn of
weakness:
Like other members of the congregatIon, she IS returned to
the world. For her and her family, thIs means the Compson
place

73. BALL, supra note 1, at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).
74. [d. at 82-95.
75. WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURy (1946).
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Dilsey had been unburdened, really unburdened, but m
order to return to the burdemng world and not m order to
escape from it
Dilsey's post-Easter world· IS unalleVIated of ordinarmess,
but that IS not to say it remams the same. Its ground has
been fundamentally, radically reVIsed.
The Compson place contInues along its customary traJectory But its foundatIons have been shaken. Dilsey's Infinite
eXIstence mtersects her finite eXIstence, Judgmg the sound
and fury of the Compson household. The mtersectIon IS both
radical and unremarked
~
Her contInumg life m the Compson household may be read
together with Jesus' paSSIve conservatIsm m the face of Roman Impenalism and militarIsm
Similarly, MartIn Luther King's non-VIolence and subsequent assassmatIon only
hIghlight the fact that hIs dream of a raCIally reconciled
South undercut the old raCIst premIses
Ammated by Easter, Dilsey was no more acqUIescent than
revolutIOnary, although she mIght appropnately have been
either or both
She IS ready for what lies ahead. Without romantICIsm or
sentImentality,
[s]he could bear the abuse and the burdens of the Compsons, but her life was also a remonstrance
agamst them. She was capable of rebukIng as well as of acceptIng, of war as well as of peace
Dilsey recollects the Lamb m the mIdst of the kitchen. She
smgs hymns there not as a religIOUS mterlude but m the
mIdst of her life and m support of it. Unburdened, she becomes burdened agam: comfortIng the afflicted BenJamm,
protectIng Dilsey, rebukIng Jason. 76

The second example comes from TOnI MaTTIson's Beloved. 77
Baby Suggs, the non-ordamed mInIster, teaches a people,
through her preachIng, to ''love theIr flesh," and by so domg,

76. BALL, supra note 1, at 87-90 (pages and footnotes omitted).
77. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
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teaches a theretofore unloved and despIsed community to love
themselves:
In the summer, every afternoon, she led the community to a
clearmg ill the woods where her heart "pumped out love" and
her mouth "spoke the Word." She called the children to
laugh, and the men to dance and the women to cry until the
dancmg and laugbmg and crymg were all InlXed up and exhaustmg, and then:
She did not tell them to clean up theIr lives or to go
and sm no more. She did not tell them they were the
blessed of the earth, its mheritmg meek or its
glorybound pure.
She told them that the only grace they could have
was the grace they could IDlagme. That if they could
not see it, they would not have it.
"Here," she SaId, "in thIs here place, we flesh; flesh
that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet ill
grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love
your flesh. They despIse it. They don't love your eyes;
they'd Just as soon pICk em out. No more do they love
the skill on your back. Yonder they flay it
You got
to love it, you!
More than eyes or feet. More than
lungs that have yet to draw free aIr. More than your
life-holding womb and your life-gIvrng prIvate parts,
hear me now, love your heart. For thIs IS the prIze."
Saymg no more, she stood up then and danced with her
twIsted hIp the rest of what her heart had to say while
the others opened theIr mouths and gave her the muSIC.78

Both Dilsey's and Baby Suggs' experIences are "religIOUS," but
they are religIOUS experIences that return the believer to the
community, and the lives, that can nurture life, and, therefore,
return the believer to the Word of God.
Ball's explanatIon of the way -In whIch religIon can sometImes
"come alive" In the way described above IS that God's Word, on
occaSIon "adopts" religIon. 79 ReligIon can be, although it by no
means Inevitably IS, the way by whIch God's Word IS revealed.

78. BALL, supra note 1, at 91 (quoting MORRISON, supra note 77, at 88-89).

79. [d. at 85-86.
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But at tImes it IS, and when it IS, it IS because it has been
"adopted" by God's Word toward precIsely that end:
There IS nothIng here about human fulfillment, or human
flourIshIng, or ethIcal values, or the power of positIve thmkmg, or what one must do to be saved, or the believrng self
and its work of belief, or of applicatIons of biblical teachIngs
to daily life. Instead, there IS the Word. And there IS belief,
but belief happens, IS enacted, IS generated by the communal
proclamatIon.
In the religIon it thus adopts, the Word, although
mcorrespondent, becomes nonetheless accessible-m words
and m hearts speakIng beyond the need for words
The
mcorrespondent Word, the wholly other, IS contextually, partIcularly human.
ThIs IS critIcal. ReligIon adopted by the Word IS not about
religIon or the self but about the world and humans,
about
the struggle "to make and to keep human life human m the world."
Her religIon-religIon adopted by the Word-Is determmatlVe of who she IS as a human and of how she IS human. It
cannot occupy an Isolated sphere either metaphYSIcal or pnvate. It gIves her humanity and life mstead of rescumg her
from either.so

Thus, the ultImate ''Yes'' follows the penultImate "No."
Ball's account of religIosity IS relevant to contemporary legal
practIce and scholarshIp m two ways. The first IS SImply methodolOgIcal: Ball's dialectIcal method, whIch George Hunsmger
calls the "Chalcedoman pattern,,81 and whIch conSIsts of the
"penultImate no followed by the ultImate yes," finds a close parallel m the attitudinal stance of critIcal femImst and race scholars, and perhaps of progreSSIve legal scholars generally, toward
law There too, one finds a penultImate critIque of law and its
legitImatmg functIOns, followed by an ultImate embrace. 82 Con-

80. [d. (footnotes omitted).
81. See zd. at 102; see also GEORGE HUNSINGER, How TO READ KARL BARTH: THE
SHAPE OF HIS THEOLOGY 85 (1991).
82. For a detailed diSCUSSIOn of thIS phenomenon, see Robm West, Constitutional
Skepticzsm, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992).
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sIder, for example, Cathanne MacKinnon's account of her own
scholarshIp regarding the meamng of equality In constitutIonal
and federal cIvil nghts law· "The first part of these reflectIons
takes on the complacency of the VIew that women have nghts
when we do not; the second part stands agaInst the luxunous
cymcIsm that deSPaIrIngly assumes women have no nghts when
we do, or could.,,83 Similarly, Man Matsuda argues explicitly
that from the perspectIve of the "VOIces at the bottom," law IS
penultImately an obstacle, but UltImately a potentIal ally for
liberatIon and equality 84
How to explaIn thIs ambIvalence? It IS possible, of course, to
VIew thIs critIcal ambIvalence as beIng SImply strategIc: where
law helps, then embrace it, where law hurts, reSIst it. But
"strategy" IS not a very satIsfyIng account for the actual expenence of the ambIvalence described, and felt, above. PartIcularly
the ultImate embrace, but also I thInk the penultImate critIque
as well, feels more authentIc than Instrumental-more substantIve and In a sense more "total," than strategIc. I have always
felt myself at a loss when tryIng to describe thIs phenomenon.
Ball's descnptIon of the relatIon between religIon and God's
Word, and partIcularly of the way In whIch religIon IS from tIme
to tIme "adopted" by the Word, or "intersects" with the Word,
suggests what mIght be a more satIsfyIng account than the strategIc one given above, although it IS by necessity a metaphoncal
one.
The account IS SImply thIs: Law stands to JustIce preCIsely as
Ball argues that "religIon" stands to God's Word. Law cannot
serve as a bndge to JustIce, any more than religIon can serve as
a bndge to God's Word. We cannot "reach" JustIce by stnVIng to
make our law evermore pure. JustIce IS not an abstract state to
be achIeved through an InSIstence on the Integrity, wholeness,
purity, or conSIstency of laws. To thInk of law In thIs way-as
the bndge, so to speak, to JustIce, if only we can get it nght-Is
a "mISdirectIOn." It mISCOnCeIves the nature of JustIce. JustIce,

83. Catharme A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1324 (1991).
84. See Marl Matsuda, Lookmg to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987).
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like God's Word, must "direct" its seeker to the realm of life,
commumty and relatIons among people. The Just socIety IS not a
metaphysIcal state of bemg to be achIeved through some sort of
purifyIng legalistIc process, Just as an mdiVIdual understanding
of the nature of JustIce IS not somethIng to be achIeved through
an abstracted mtellectual pursuit. But nor IS it the case that law
IS Irrelevant to JustIce. Rather, as religIOn IS sometImes adopted
by God's Word, or mtersects with it, law can sometImes be
"adopted" by JustIce. When it IS, JustIce Inheres m law, and when
It IS, JustIce IS found, not m the law itself, but m the relatIons
between Just people serving commumtIes, and domg so with the
mechamsms and substance of a Just law
Let me try to spell thIs out m a little more detail. Recall the
first step of Ball's argument: religion at its worst IS m the serVice of power, with familiar attendant evils. But religion at its
best IS also problematIc. The problem with religion at its best, IS
that by puttmg itself forward as a brIdge to God, it turns the
believer's quest for transcendence narCIssIstIcally mward. "Religion IS finally centered on the self. The Word directs to the other.,,85 But religion can, from tIme to tIme be "adopted" by God's
Word, and when it IS, It returns the believer toward the work of
engagement with communitIes of life.
Now, of course, law at ~ts worst can be, and should be, critIcIzed. And it IS. Constantly Law at its worst legitImates, m the
sense meant by the crItIcal legal scholars, the commands,
whIms, will, and mterests, of the politIcally dOmInant sectors of
a legal community There IS also, however, a moral problem with
law at ~ts best, and it IS the far more subtle problem suggested
by Ball's crItICal account of religiOSIty-the penultImate "No."
Thmk for a moment of Ronald Dworkin's mspired liberal legal
accounts of law as bemg constantly defined and redefined by its
''best'' aspiratIOns. 86 Dworkin's account may be the ''best'' account of law "at ItS best." According to Dworkin, the very defimtIon of law, and certaInly its substance, ought to be understood
by reference to ItS Idealized content. Law "at its best," Dworkin

85. BALL, supra note I, at 98.
86. RoNALD DWORKIN, A MATI'ER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [heremafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
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argues, when properly understood, 1,S the bndge by whIch we
reach an understanding of the content of politIcal JustIce,87 Just
as, In a strikIngly analogous way, religIOn "at its best," according
to Ball, presents itself as a bndge to the Word of God, and acceptance by Him. But In the case of law, Just as In the case of
religIOn, by vzrtue of that fact, law "at its best" In effect keeps us
away from the realm In whIch JustIce may be found and crafted,
Just as, analogously, religIOn, by VIrtue of its self-presentatIOn as
a bndge to God, keeps -the devotee away from the human realm
In whIch God's Word may be revealed. Because law at its best
presents itself as the bndge to JustIce, it keeps the legal practItIoner, scholar, or Judge out of the realm of community and life,
the realm In -whIch JustIce may In fact be realized through the
medium of Just people dOIng what JustIce reqUIres for the communitIes In whIch they labor, and turned Instead toward the
realm of the actual and Ideal law on the books, constantly bettenng itself through InterpretatIon, modificatIOn, amendment
and change. It keeps the legal practitIOner or scholar Immersed
In the group narratIve proJect of perfectIng, through telling,
retelling, and reInterpretmg, the story of law It prOmIses JustIce
as the end result oftms obsessIOn with the perfectIon oflaw, but
its prOmIse IS and must be illusory Law at its best keeps the
legal believer In the ultImately narCIssIstIc CIrcle of legallIDagmIngs. The penultImate ''NO.''88
But, at least on occaSIOn, tms very JlinsprudentIal proJect-the liberal legal proJect so well described by DworkIn, of
the law, through the work of Judges, lawyers and scholars, constantly seekIng to render itself more Just-can be put to the
serVIce of JustIce, by persons workmg In the community toward
the end of a Just world. When it IS, I tmnk it makes sense to say
that law has been "adopted" by JustIce. When we use law In such
CIrcumstances, we use it not Just "strategIcally," but we align
ourselves with it; it becomes a moral undertakIng. We become

87. DworkIn has made thIS argument m a vanety of ways m many different writmgs, but perhaps rus clearest statement appears m rus essay How Law Is Like
Literature, m A MA'ITER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160-64 (1985).
88. Robert Cover of Yale makes a sImilar critique m Violence of the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (discussmg the mterplay between legal mterpretation and
VIolence).
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comnntted to it through and through, and Justifiably so. The
ultImate ''Yes.'' Let me present two examples of what I now
thInk of as ''law adopted by JustIce." One comes, agaIn, from a
student, and one from the work of a scholar.
A student approached me thIs semester wantIng to discuss a
possible law review note m whIch she wanted to attack, under
the First Amendment, the constItutIOnality of ordinances whIch
forbId protestors from disruptIng sport huntmg, by demonstratmg agaInst the practIce m woods and forests where huntIng IS
allowed. The problem wIth her argument, as she conceded, IS
that the conduct prohibited by the ordinances IS clearly more
than Just speech. The ordinance IS aImed at prohibitIng the disruptIon of the hunt, and the protestors are most assuredly aImmg not Just to VOIce theIr VIews but to disrupt that lawful behavIOr.
My student, like the protestors she wants to help, IS an ethIcal vegetanan deeply concerned about our reckless cruelty to
ammals, and partIcularly about theIr casual slaughter and consumptIon for pleasure. She wants very much to find a way to
use the First Amendment to further the protestors' cause and
the ammals' well-bemg. The problem, of course, IS that it IS not
at all clear she can do so, gIven the protestors' avowed mtentIon
to disrupt lawful behaVIor and not merely express lawful dissent. She feels herself stuck on the horns of a dilemma. She can
mIsstate the protestors' goals, by limItIng theIr acts to "speech,"
and then make a conventIOnal and possibly successful First
Amendment argument. AlternatIvely, she could state theIr goals
correctly, m whIch case, gIven her understanding of the law, at
best she could use theIr plight as a spnngboard for critIcIzmg
the unduly cramped and limited reach of the First Amendment.
What she could not figure out a way to do, of course, IS what she
wanted to do, and that was to use law as a bndge to achIeve
what she strongly saw to be the Just conclUSIOn: protectIng the
protest itself, even aSSUmIng that ItS mtent as well as effect
would be to disrupt the lawful practIce of huntIng for sport.
I suggested to thIs student that she read, m additIon to the
relevant First Amendment law, Ronald DworkIn's early essays
m Takmg R~ghts Serwusly, and partIcularly the chapters m that
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work devoted to diScussIons of cIvil disobedience. 89 She did so,
and has SInce returned to her project with a renewed sense of
purpose. I suggest that her use of DworkIn's JUrIsprudentIal
project lnlght be understood, loosely, as analogous to the "ultImate Yes" that Ball eventually bestows upon some religIous
practIces. Put differently, In the hands of a practitIoner concerned to brIng JustIce to and In the world, the JUrIsprudentIal
liberal legal project so well described by DworkIn lnlght be
"adopted" by JustIce. The "lnlsdirectIon" noted In DworkIn's proJect, or the "penultImate no" bestowed upon it, lnlght become
from tIme to tIme the "ultImate yes."
DworkIn argued, it may be recalled, In hIs early work that the
ConstitutIon does and should protect (despite Supreme Court
authority to the contrary) the acts of draft protestors even
though theIr protests Involved illegal acts, because of the ult~
mate illegality and unconstitutIonality of the war itself, even
though the war had not been authoritatIvely found unconstitutIonal. 90 The ConstitutIon, understood "in its best light,"
DworkIn argued, condemns the war as an unconstitutIonal use
of governmental force. Accordingly, the ConstitutIon should
protect the "protestors" of that illegal and unconstitutIonal governmental act agaInst arrest for theIr concededly illegal actIVItIes. 91 Our commitment to VIgorous protest and dissent, the
spIrit of whIch IS captured In our First Amendment, should be
deep enough to protect the actIvitIes of protest, and the partICIpants agaInst arrest, when the constitutIonal claIm they are
makIng IS a colorable one.
That argument IS a quite stunmng example of law "adopted
by" JustIce. Law, partIcularly constitutIonal law, was beIng read
"in its best light" not so as to create an abstract bndge toward a
rarified understanding of the reqUIrements of politIcal JustIce,
but rather, so as to be pressed toward a Just result In a partIcular community at a partIcular tIme-the protectIon of the orgamzed protest of the Vietnam War. The Idealized account of law

89. See RONALD DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience, m TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 86, at 206-22 (1977).
90. [d. at 220-22.
91. [d. at 214-15, 221.
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presented m Dworkm's early work, unlike lns later work, was
presented as a way by wlnch JustIce could be done m commumty-not as a way that the meamng of JustIce could be grasped m
mtellectual or JudicIal cIrcles.
To return to my student's problem: it IS certaInly possible to
see the acts of the ammal nghts actIVIsts m tlns situatIOn as m
oppositIOn to, and mdeed lnghlightmg the shortsIghtedness of,
our constitutIOnal scheme of libertIes. The First Amendment
does not protect tlns actIvity, albeit perhaps it should, and hence
the actIVIty exposes the madequacIes of the First Amendment.
But it IS also possible to argue that although current understanding does not reflect it, the First Amendment does and
should protect tlns actIvity To put the pomt mImmally, surely it
IS possible, or at least my student IS now attemptIng to argue
that it IS possible, to VIew state protectIOn of the actIvity targeted by these protestors-huntmg for sport-as an unconstitutIOnal attack on ammals, even though current understanding IS
umformly to the contrary Surely it IS also possible to argue, by
analogy to Dworkm's argument regarding the draft resIsters,
that our commitment to dissent and protest, mstitutIonalized
through the First Amendment, IS deep enough to protect that
actIvity accordingly Like Dworkm's argument for the draft resIsters, the argument my student wants to make for the hunt
protestors (and through them, of course, for the ammals) reqUIres an Idealized constitutIOn-It IS only the ConstitutIon
when read "in its best light," and most emphatIcally not the
ConstitutIOn when read by the current Supreme Court or mdeed
by any lnstoncal Court-that condemns state protectIOn of huntmg for sport as an unconstItutIonal mfnngement of the nghts of
ammals. But also like DworkIn's ongInal argument, the IdealIzed constItutIOn It artIculates IS m the serVIce not of an abstract
account of the nature of JustIce, but .rather, a concrete result
sought on behalf of members of an eXIstmg community For that
very reason, like DworkIn's actual argument on behalf of draft
resIsters, tlns student's constItutIOnal claIm on behalf of hunt
protestors IS an mstance, I would argue, usmg Ball's language,
of "law adopted by JustIce." Neither argument seeks to "perfect
the constitutIOnal narratIve" as a means of aclneVIng an abstract
JustIce. Both seek to understand law "at ItS best" not as a bndge
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by whIch the Ideal law that IS the ultImate outcome of the constitutIOnal narratIve mIght be revealed; but rather, as a means
of "doIng JustIce" In the community, as a means of achIevIng a
Just result between members of that community
ThIs (modified) Ballian metaphor of ''law adopted by JustIce"
captures two strands of our way of thInkIng about JustIce that
more conventIonal accounts do not capture well. First, it captures the sense (and it IS only a sense) In whIch JustIce IS "prIor"
to law, In a way that IS analogous to Ball's InSIstence on the
"PrIority" of God, or the diVIne, to the human. JustIce sImply "lS,
and when it IS, it IS m and of the world-it Inheres In human
relatIons, and In human communitIes. It IS not an Ideal abstractIon that legal doctrIne progressIvely apprOXImates by "workIng
itself pure." To seek JustIce through the study or purificatIon of
law IS, to use Ball's word, a mISdirectIOn. 92 Rather, JustIce IS In
the world, and it may on occaSIOn Intersect with law, and when
it does so, law IS a vehIcle for its realizatIon.
Second, the modified Ballian metaphor captures somethIng
about the ambIvalence toward legal InstitutIons so central to
progressIve lawyerIng, whIch more strategIc or Instrumental
accounts of that ambIvalence leave out, and that IS, In a sense,
the sp"lnt of the commitment to law that a seeker of JustIce may
feel, when law has Indeed been "adopted" by JustIce. When we
argue, for example, that a certaIn state of affaIrs IS unconstItutIonal, it feels like we are saYIng more than that a certaIn
state of affaIrs IS VIolatIve of a legal document that IS itself
hOrrIfically unJust but that from tIme to tIme mIght be used
Instrumentally to achIeve some gaIn In JustIce for subordinated
peoples. It feels, rather, like we are alignmg the constitutIonal
claIm with the moral claIm from JustIce, and there IS no ObVIOUS
way the strategIc account of the relatIon between law and JustIce
can fully capture that feeling of alignment. The Ballian "adoptIon" metaphor, though, does capture that feeling, and rather
nIcely Law IS not SImply beIng "used" as a way to "get at" JUStIce; rather, from tIme to tIme, law IS adopted by JustIce, law
"intersects" with JustIce. At those POInts of IntersectIon, it IS
fully approprIate-it IS certaInly not a manifestatIon of legalistIc
92. BALL, supra note 1, at 73-95 & passlm.
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false conSCIOusness-to align one's moral and legalist commitments, and conVlctIOns. At those pomts, law manifests JustIce.
One can, I trunk, find examples of law "adopted by JustIce" not
only m occasIOnal moments of legal practIce narrowly understood, but m legal scholarsrup as well. One notable example IS
the constItutIOnal scholarsrup of Akhll Amar.93 Amar's reconstructIve work on the Tlnrteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
seeks an engagement with law m the serVIce of JustIce that IS
more than Just strategIc and that IS more than academIc. The
sense of JustIce that anImates rus rustorIcal reconstructIon of the
Civil War Amendments IS one that pushes rum to find In the
rustorIcal record eVldence of the unfulfilled prOmIse of those
amendments to create a Just, as well as beloved, community
The relatIOn between law and JustIce realized m Amar's rustOrIcal JUrIsprudence on the ReconstructIOn Amendments IS not that
of a practIce strIVlng toward an Ideal. Law IS not understood m
that work as a practIce constantly mOVlng toward an Ideal of
JustIce, m turn mformed by the demands of consIstency, mternal
coherence or mtegrity Indeed, JustIce IS not "infOrmIng" the
directIOn law should take at all; it IS not a Vlrtue toward wruch
law strIves. Rather, what seems to lie berund Amar's rustOrIcal
constItutIonalism IS the sense that JustIce IS ever present and
mayor may not ammate law, or a law, from the start. JustIce IS
realized m the relatIOns between people and, from tIme to tIme,
realized through the adopted mechamsms of law The ReconstructIon Amendments, Amar mIght be understood as arguIng,
themselves are an example of a law "adopted by JustIce." His
own work uneartrung the OrIgInal understanding of the ReconstructIon Amendments, it seems to me, IS another.
Nor, though, IS the sense of JustIce m Amar's scholarsrup, and
the relatIOnshIp between JustIce and law it seems to suggest, the
relatIon of ambIvalent strategIsm suggested above; the pomt
does not seem to be that with enough of the nght kmd of clever

93. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Milling Amendments: R.AV
v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992); Akhil R. Amar & Damel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thzrteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minzmal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 37 (1990).
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scholarshIp, one can present an Infinitely malleable hIstoncal
text In such a way as to make it appear as though the hIstoncal
record can serve a present progressIve politIcal agenda. Rather,
the clmm IS, Instead, that the law In thIs case zs Just-not that it
can be "made" Just, or convIncIngly argued to serve JustIce, but
that it IS Just, and was Just In its InceptIon. ThIs law, these
Amendments, were adopted by JustIce. The commitment to JUStIce, and the commitment to law, In thIs case, at thIs hIstoncal
moment, with respect to thIs pIece of hIstory, are one and the
same.
IV CONCLUSION

To return to Ball's work, the seven legal practIces Ball describes mIght themselves be consIdered examples of the adoptIOn
of law by JustIce. It IS hIghly sIgnificant, I thInk, although I'm
not sure precIsely what IS sIgnified, that nowhere does Ball hImself describe them In that way AgaIn, Ball presents these practIces as examples oflives In law that are responSIve to the Word
of God. It IS InterestIng to speculate as to why it IS that a book
called The Word and The Law has so little, really nothIng, to say
about JustIce. One reasonably mIght read quite a bit Into that
pregnant negatIve. But whatever the author's own VIews, surely
it IS not too much of a stretch to see these practIces as exemplary not Just of a partIcular and praIseworthy relatIOn with God's
Word, but also exemplary of a relatIOn with a quite different
VIrtue.
These practIces are all, one mIght argue, USIng Ball's vocabulary In a way umntended by hIm but hopefully not out of line
with hIs overall aIms, examples-of legal practIces that have been
"adopted by JustIce." They all, no doubt, use law to achIeve JUStIce. But agaIn, the relatIon revealed In these practIces between
law and JustIce IS more than strategIc. Law "comes alive" for
these practitIOners and theIr clients precIsely because the law
has been used not merely for JustIce, but by JustIce-it IS JustIce
that has effectuated the adoptIon. The practitIOners themselves
have Indeed been "taken up" by somethIng larger than themselves. AgaIn, Ball Identifies that whIch has "taken them up" as
"God's Word." It would not be InCOnSIstent, though, with hIs descnptIon of either those practIces or of theIr moral tenor to Iden-
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tIfy the VIrtue withm whIch they practice as Justice. I would say,
then, sImply, that these are ''legal practices" whIch have been
adopted by Justice. What these practices, so understood, ultimately reveal IS the possibility of a legal practice that IS not Just
aImed "toward the end" of Justice, but one that, because it IS a
practice of law, also and for that reason IS a practice of Justice as
well.
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